San Joaquin College of Law

Civil Procedure FINAL EXAM 2002/ Cartier

Question 1

Patient, a resident of Rhode Island, was referred by her orthodontist to Dr. Dan in December 1997 for correction of an overbite problem. Patient’s orthodontist and Dr. Dan were classmates in dental school in Rhode Island. After graduation, Dr. Dan set up his office in Connecticut. He frequently visits family and friends in Rhode Island and has a vacation cottage there. Dr. Dan first saw Patient in January 1998 and performed surgery on her in a Connecticut hospital in February 1998. Patient was immediately aware that the surgery was not successful. She last saw Dr. Dan in April 2000. In February 2002, Patient filed a personal injury action against Dr. Dan in the United States District Court in Rhode Island. The summons and complaint in this action were served (as permitted by state law) on the office manager at Dr. Dan’s office in Connecticut in March 2002. Dr. Dan filed a motion to dismiss the case for want of personal jurisdiction. In reply, Patient filed a motion to transfer the case to Connecticut. The court denied the motion to dismiss but, without explaining its reasoning, did order the case transferred to the District of Connecticut. Dr. Dan has moved for summary judgment. While the facts regarding Patient’s treatment and condition are in dispute, Patient has presented evidence that there were problems and complications caused by Dr. Dan’s medical negligence. Dr. Dan admits the surgery was not successful but denies any medical negligence. He further asserts that Patient’s action is barred by the statute of limitations. Under Connecticut law, the action must be commenced with the filing and service of a complaint within two years of the injury. Under the law of Rhode Island, the statute of limitations is tolled while the patient remains under the continuing care of the provider. Patient asserts that the action is timely since Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, “An action is commenced with the filing of a complaint.”

1.          Was Dr. Dan subject to personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island? DISCUSS.

2.          Was the case properly transferred to Connecticut? DISCUSS.

3.          How should the court rule on Dr. Dan’s motion for summary judgment? DISCUSS.

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4.          If Patient were successful in obtaining a judgment against Dr. Dan, what preclusive effect would such a judgment have in an action by Plaintiff against her orthodontist for negligent referral? DISCUSS.

Question 2

This action arises from a vehicle collision on a Missouri interstate highway. Passenger, a resident of Oklahoma, was in a recreational vehicle (RV) when it rear-ended a Missouri department of Transportation (MDOT) truck. Before the collision, a tractor-trailer (semi), owned by Snyder, Inc. (a Nevada Corporation with its principal place of business in Wisconsin) was between the RV and the MDOT truck. Snyder’s semi pulled out of the lane to avoid the slow moving MDOT vehicle and the RV hit the MDOT vehicle, injuring Passenger and RV-Driver. The RV was being driven by RV-Driver, a resident of Oklahoma. An action asserting claims for personal injury to Passenger and to RV-Driver was filed against Snyder and against its unidentified driver in Missouri state court alleging that, while acting in the course and scope of his employment, Snyder’s driver failed to warn of the impending dangerous slow-moving MDOT truck. Upon being properly served in this action, Snyder removed the case to the United States District Court and filed a counterclaim against RV-Driver. Passenger filed a motion to amend his complaint to allege a claim against Driver and to remand the case to state court. The district court granted the motion to amend the complaint but denied the motion for remand. Snyder then filed a 12(b)6 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, since its driver owed no duty to the RV under Missouri law. While a 1996 federal case held that such a duty of care existed under Missouri law, a recent state appellate opinion held no such duty exists. The court granted Snyder’s 12(b)6 motion. Passenger filed a timely appeal.

1.          Is the appeal properly before the court? DISCUSS.

2.          Which of the claims (claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, or third-party claims) are properly before the court? DISCUSS.

3.          Was the court correct in granting Snyder’s 12(b)6 motion? DISCUSS.

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4.          Was the trial court correct in refusing to remand the case? DISCUSS.

San Joaquin College of Law

Civil Procedure–FINAL EXAM 2002 Sketch Answer/ Cartier

Here is a quick take on what might have been found in this exam:

QUESTION 1:

PERSONAL JURISDICTION. For Rhode Island (RI) to exercise personal jurisdiction over Dr. Dan, who lives and practices medicine in Connecticut (CT), Dr. Dan must have minimum contacts with RI so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although he went to school in RI and still visits friends in RI, this type of contact is unrelated to the lawsuit and does not support jurisdiction. Dr. Dan also owns a vacation cottage in RI. Prior to 1977, mere ownership of land within a state could subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction (quasi-in-rem), at least to the value of the property. The Supreme Court determined that all exercises of jurisdiction are really over persons. It appears that for want of minimum contacts related to this law suit, Dr. Dan is not subject to personal jurisdiction in RI.

TRANSFER: If a case is filed in an appropriate venue, it may be transferred (pursuant to § 1404) to a district court where it could have been filed. Venue is appropriate where the defendant resides or where a substantial amount of the events giving rise to the case took place. In this fact pattern, CT is the proper venue and RI is not. If a case is transferred pursuant to § 1404, the law of the transferor court applies. If venue is NOT appropriate in the initial court, the court may dismiss or may transfer the case (pursuant to § 1406) to a court where venue is proper.. Here since venue was not proper in Ri, the court could and did transfer the case to CT. Here, the RI court lacked personal jurisdiction over Dr. Dan. Pursuant to §1631, the court could transfer the case to where it could have been filed. In this type of transfer, the law of the transferee court would apply.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT: A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no triable issue of material fact and on party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The facts tell us there is a dispute as to whether the doctor was negligent. A summary judgment on this issue would not be proper. If, however, the statute of limitations bars the action, a summary judgment would be proper. The action might survive using the RI statute of limitations which didn’t start to run until Dr. Dan quit treating Patient. As noted above, however, the RI statute of limitations will not apply in the Ct court because venue was not proper in RI. The action is clearly barred by CT’s two year from date of injury statute of limitations. FRCP 3 does not purport to operate as a statue of limitations in a diversity case in federal court. Federal courts are obligated in a diversity action to sit as another state court. The federal court cannot give an action more life than it would have in the state court for such would violate the twin aims of Erie–to eliminate forum shopping and to avoid inequitable administration of the laws.

QUESTION 2:

APPEAL: An aggrieved party may appeal a final judgment. Passenger’s claim, dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)6, a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is a final judgment. While the court might have permitted Passenger to amend his complaint, where it is apparent that Plaintiff cannot plead a valid cause of action, a dismissal with prejudice is proper. It appears the appeal is based on Plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court applied the wrong law which results in a de novo review.

CLAIMS/COUNTERCLAIMS/CROSS-CLAIMS/THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS: Passenger and R-V Driver may join together, under Rule 20 to file claims against the joint defendants, Snyder and its unidentified driver, since the claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence and involve a common question of law or fact–namely negligence. Since unidentified driver was not served, he is not a party. As sole defendant, Snyder removed the case to federal court. Removal of a diversity case is proper if the case could have been brought in Federal court, provide defendant is not sued in his home state. The case does not involve a federal question. The federal court is empowered to hear this case only if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction [complete diversity + amount in controversy] are satisfied. Plaintiffs are from Oklahoma; Snyder is a citizen of its state of incorporation, Nevada, and its principal place of business, Wisconsin). Complete diversity is satisfied and Snyder was not sued in its home state. So long as the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the court could hear this claim. Note, plaintiffs cannot aggregate their claims to meet the amount in controversy.

             Snyder’s claim against RV-Driver is a counterclaim. If it is based on the same event, it is a compulsory counterclaim that will be afforded supplemental jurisdiction even if independent subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. If not based on the same transaction or occurrence, this counterclaim would be permissive and would require independent subject matter jurisdiction [diversity + amount in controversy].

             After the case was properly removed, Passenger sought leave to amend his complaint to assert a claim against “Driver.” If Driver is the R-V driver, the amendment is not proper since diversity would be destroyed. It looks like Passenger might be trying to assert a cross-claim (party against a co-party) against R-V Driver. Plaintiff’s do not get the benefit of supplemental jurisdiction in suits against parties joined under R. 20. While the court can, in appropriate circumstances, realign the parties to maintain diversity, this will not work here since Passenger and R-V Driver are both from Oklahoma. If “Driver” is anyone other than R-V Driver, the amendment would be proper so long as diversity is not destroyed and the amount in controversy is met. If Driver is the “unidentified driver” or another party. plaintiff can amend his complaint but will have to serve the defendant.

12(b)6: The court dismissed Passenger’s claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under ERIE, a federal court sitting in diversity applies state substantive law. Here there is a conflicting interpretation of what state law is regarding the duty of care Snyder owed. A prior federal case said a duty existed; a more recent state appellate case held not. Neither of these cases is controlling. The district court must decide what it thinks the state supreme court would decide on the matter. Here, the district court took a position consistent with the state appellate court. On review, the Circuit court will uphold this determination unless it believes the state supreme court would reach a different conclusion. Another possible basis for the appeal would be that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case after permitting passenger to amend his complaint (if Driver destroyed diversity). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the 12(b)6 ruling would be void.